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(I)  Introduction: Motivations for applying to join the European Union 
 
 
Enlargement has been an issue for the European Union virtually since its inception. The first formal 
applications for membership were made as early as 1961 - by Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway. 
(Indeed, the Norwegian saga has continued to the present day.) Around the same time, Greece and 
Turkey concluded association agreements which, in their case, anticipated eventual accession. Since 
1961 the EU's membership has grown from its original six to nine, ten, twelve and, since the beginning 
of this year to fifteen. Beyond that there are currently five live applications - from Turkey, Cyprus, 
Malta, Poland and Hungary - some of which have been effectively diverted by the EU (but the 
applicants have not gone away) or remain to be addressed. In the medium term, the EU can 
realistically expect applications from the remaining countries who already have, have agreed and 
initialled, or are negotiating Europe Agreements. 
  It is fashionable to attribute this widespread interest in membership to the great success of the 
European Union, particularly economic success. However, whilst there is a positive element based on 
perceptions of that kind, there is also a negative aspect. Specifically, there are three components of this: 
firstly, fears of the implications of not joining the EU; secondly, the failure or perceived failure of 
alternatives to membership; and, thirdly, EU accession is seen as a means of pursuing domestic 
objectives in the applicant states rather than because of any attraction to European integration. The 
`fear' element is principally related to exclusion from the single European market. This is mainly not 
based on the rather crude `Fortress Europe' concept, although there may be a little of this, but rather 
reflects more pragmatic and specific concerns. These relate to things like exclusion from the setting of 
technical standards, exclusion from EU public procurement markets, and loss of investment (both 
domestic and foreign) as this is diverted into the EU's single market. A secondary basis for fear stems 
from the growing perception that the European Union is `Europe' and not being a member implies not 
being part of the European mainstream. 
  This `fear' element should not be underestimated. There is no doubt that it was the driving force 
behind the interest in EFTA which ultimately led to three EFTA members joining the EU this year. 
These countries did not suddenly recognise the error of their ways and become converted to the cause 
of a federal Europe. Their entry bids were based on hard economic calculations that they stood more to 
lose by staying out of the EU than going in. Their referenda campaigns and results (including - perhaps 
especially - Norway's) are clear evidence of this. This then has critical implications for the future 
development of the EU because, if these new members have not changed their spots, then they may 
seek to change the form that the `success' of European integration will take and possibly even 
backtrack on that which it currently takes. 
  The failure (real or perceived) of alternatives also takes two forms: 
 *  Failure of alternative European groupings or forms of intra-European cooperation. This was 
clearly the case with the communist bloc in eastern/central Europe but also EFTA had become 
somewhat moribund. Its geographical dispersion has never been helpful and since the defection of 
Britain it has lacked the size and political clout to face the EU as an equal. More fundamentally, EFTA 
has always been an organisation with limited aspirations and nowhere much to go beyond a free trade 
area. It has therefore lacked dynamism and, to some extent, a sense of purpose. It has also been unable 
to put on a united external front - for example, in its approach to the European Economic Area. Indeed, 
EFTA's few acts of collective action since its inception have been rather aptly described as `occasional 
flashes of light on a darkening horizon'.1 EFTA lacks coherence and depth as an organisation. 
*  Failure of alternative (to membership) relationships with the EU, notably association and the 
European Economic Area (EEA).2 Association is actually a rather vague concept which was originally 
only broadly defined as `creating ... reciprocal rights and obligations, joint actions and special 
procedures.'3 Consequently, association has effectively been defined by practice and would seem to 
consist of a `trade agreement plus'. However, association agreements are beset by safeguards and 
exclusions on the part of the EU, have proved difficult to manage and, in any case, their benefits tend 
to be eroded in value as the EU gives similar benefits to non-associated countries through other 
agreements and the GSP. They also suffer from the same drawback as the EEA: the EU only allows 
full members to take decisions and other members of the EEA and associates ultimately have little 
choice but to accept them. The EEA is also a very one-sided agreement in that the final terms of the 
agreement were very much those wanted by the EU rather than EFTA. Consequently, in the face of all 
these disadvantages, most countries who want to accede to the EU see little value in a transitional 
phase of association or EEA membership; they would rather move directly to EU accession. 
 
The lack of alternatives means that, as with the fear factor, prospective EU members may increasingly 
be joining for the `wrong' reason - not because they share the vision of Europe of existing members (or 
at least the majority) but because they do not want to be left out. This implies that an EU of fifteen plus 
may become an increasingly broad church which lacks a unified vision of the way forward. 
  Finally, turning to EU accession as a means of achieving domestic objectives. All the current 
applicants (and most likely future applicants) are relatively poor, compared to the EU member states. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, they all see EU membership as a means of increasing their economic 
prosperity, in the short term through access to the EU's structural funds and other financial resources 
and, in the long run (although this is not usually very well thought out) through the general benefits of 
EU membership leading to higher economic growth. Perhaps more importantly, all the aspiring 
members have specific (though more dissimilar) domestic political objectives: the eastern/central 
European states want to ensure that they remain democracies and do not drift back into communism (or 
something worse); Turkey wishes to confirm its `European vocation'; the (Greek) Cypriots see EU 
accession as a catalyst for resolving the `Cyprus problem'; finally, the Maltese Nationalists want to 
confirm Malta's position within the EU in case of, or indeed to preclude, a return to power of the 
Maltese Labour Party which is hostile to EU membership. The implications of all these negative 
motivations is that the desire to join the EU is, in most cases, not fuelled principally by a desire to 
pursue European integration as an objective in itself. An indicative example is provided by the Czech 
government. The earlier euphoria which was associated with unqualified acceptance of everything the 
EU did and stood for has given way to a degree of `Euro-scepticism' and concern with possible EU 
interference in the development of nation states, although economic interests still make EU 
membership a priority.4 
  There is also a related factor which may not favour continued integration along the lines of the 
founding fathers of the EU. The 1995 enlargement is the last `traditional' or `classical' enlargement; 
that is, it is the last one that will have been achieved with only minimal adjustment to the institutions 
and procedures of the EU. All enlargements to this point have basically involving an incremental 
approach, whereby new members are simply tacked on to the existing membership and the EU 
continues in a modified, but not fundamentally, different form. There is a limit to the extent to which 
the original Treaty of Rome framework for a membership of six can be stretched. The net result of all 
these influences is that the next enlargement of the EU will raise all kinds of possibilities. Some of 
these are explored in the concluding (fourth) section but, before that, the paper turns to a brief 
examination of the applicant states: the second section looks at the Mediterranean and the third focuses 
on eastern/central Europe.  
 
(II)  The Mediterranean Applicants 
 
 
The prospect of a further Mediterranean enlargement raises a series of complex issues which have been 
widely addressed in the case of Turkey, although rather less so for Cyprus and Malta.5 However, the 
present section will focus principally on those areas which seem most relevant to the re-ordering of EU 
affairs which will inevitably come with the accession of these countries. The three actually represent 
rather different cases. The Turks are the longest-standing applicant and have had a troubled 
relationship with the EU. After a long delay the European Commission finally gave its opinion on the 
Turkish application6 which was essentially negative. An EU-Turkey customs union was recently 
agreed and this is now the current intention. The opinions on Cyprus and Malta7 were also negative in 
the sense of ruling out immediate negotiations. Whilst eligibility for membership was confirmed for 
both countries, this required economic reform in the case of Malta and some progress towards 
resolving the political divide in the case of Cyprus, before further progress could be made. Since the 
opinions were issued the prospects for membership have improved for Malta and Cyprus but probably 
not for Turkey. 
  In the present context all three raise significant issues in terms of changes to present EU structures 
that would have to be made to accommodate them. In the case of Turkey, perhaps the key issues relate 
to its size and likely economic impact. Turkey would qualify for two Commissioners and a number of 
MEPS comparable to that of the united Germany. Furthermore, it would have a major effect on the 
balance of voting within the Council of Ministers. Whilst absorbing any large new member is difficult, 
the relative poverty of Turkey would also raise particular problems for the EU. There would be large 
demands on the structural funds and the common agricultural policy would be stretched to the limit. At 
a time of budgetary restraint in the member states of the EU it is not easy to see how this could be 
accommodated without major changes in the EU policy. It is clear that the principal - indeed the only - 
major attraction of Turkey to the EU is the contribution it can make to the common foreign and policy. 
Turkey would seem almost tailor-made for membership of an outer tier of a multi-tier EU. 
  The salient issue with regard to Malta and Cyprus (and probably the only one they have in 
common) concerns their size. The balance between small and large countries within the EU is an 
extremely sensitive issue and one that the EU has preferred not to address; Luxembourg is comparable 
but is a very special case. There are a whole range of institutional issues raised by the admission of 
micro-states, most specifically concerning their ability to run a Council presidency: this is partly a 
question of technical ability - having sufficient civil servants an bureaucrats to cope - but, more 
importantly, it is a matter of credibility. More generally, there is the matter of whether the 
disproportionately large voting rights of smaller states in the Council (and representation in the 
European Parliament) could be extended to incoming micro-states. If it were, would the larger 
members be prepared to have their favoured policies blocked by combinations including smaller 
countries which represented very small proportions of the total EU population? The question also 
concerns the present smaller EU member states who have made it quite clear that they wish their 
present (inflated) voting rights to be maintained.8 There would seem to be an incompatibility in the 
positions of small and large members. 
  For different reasons it is hard to see how the three Mediterranean aspiring members can be 
accommodated with the current EU framework. In addition to the problems already raised there are 
question marks over the implementation of one of the four freedoms of movement - of people - in two 
cases: in the case of Turkey because of its desirability (from the EU's point of view) and in the case of 
Cyprus because of its practicability. Also, the ability of all three, particularly Turkey, to participate in 
economic and monetary union except in the very long term is extremely doubtful. it is quite clear that 
these countries cannot simply be attached to the EU in the same way as Austria, Sweden and Finland 
have been. 
 
 
(III) Prospective Members from Eastern/Central Europe 
 
 The accommodation of this group of countries represents the real dilemma for the European Union. 
From a cynical perspective, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta can be ignored or at least interminably delayed. 
The EU dare not turn its back on the former members of the communist bloc. Their accommodation is 
an essential act of enlightened self-interest required to stabilise the EU's eastern border and prevent 
massive migration from east to west. There may also be economic benefits to the EU. However, 
precisely how these countries might be accommodated is a very contentious matter. The current 
Mediterranean membership of the EU is very suspicious of expansion to the east, fearing competition 
for their producers and for EU funds, and a general shift in the axis of the EU away from the south to 
the east, whilst Germany is supportive. The only other favourable member state is Britain but its 
motives are regarded as dubious and anti-communautaire by many others. 
  As in the Mediterranean there is a tendency to treat these countries as a bloc or, rather, a series of 
blocs - the Visegrad Four, Bulgaria and Romania, the Baltics and so on - when, in fact, also like the 
Mediterranean applicants, they are quite different cases. The frontrunners are generally regarded as 
being the Visegrad Four but these are very different in terms of size and economic situation. Poland is 
significantly larger than the other three and, in this respect, raises questions not dissimilar to those 
raised by Turkey. It is also, by a margin, poorer than Hungary and the Czech Republic, although 
Slovakia is poorer still. In addition, there is Slovenia - the dark horse whose time may have come much 
sooner than has been commonly realised - with a GDP per capita greater and an agricultural sector 
smaller than those of the poorer existing EU member states (Greece and Portugal). In fact, this 
tendency to treat applicants for membership as a group rather than individual cases imposes a self-
inflicted difficulty on the EU by condemning the EU to offering equality of treatment and making it 
wary of setting precedents. Thus whilst it might be feasible to admit the Czech Republic this side of 
the year 2000, this is not true of Poland; but the EU cannot do this because the two applications have 
become inextricably linked and so the process of enlargement is delayed. 
  The principal problems posed for the EU by enlargement to the east are illustrated in Table 1. The 
dependency on agriculture is greater than that of the EU, most markedly for Poland. Somewhat 
paradoxically, given the market orientation of their overall policies, the Visegrad countries have been 
moving away from liberalisation towards a more regulated, CAP-like agricultural sector.9 Whilst this 
may alleviate internal political pressure, it is unsustainable without CAP membership and EU funding. 
Unfortunately this is unlikely to happen: there is widespread agreement that either the CAP will have 
to be reformed to make it less costly or these countries cannot participate in it. 
 
 
 
 
 
  TABLE 1: INCOME, POPULATION AND AGRICULTURAL DATA 
 (Selected  Countries) 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
    1991   1991   1993    1993 
    Pop.   GDP   Agric.  (%   Agric.  (%  of 
    (Mill.)  per  cap  of  output)  employment) 
      ( U S $ )  
 
Poland   38.2      4720    6.5    28.0 
 
Hungary   10.3      6080    8.5       8.0 
 
Czech Rep.  10.4     7570   4.5       6.5 
 
Slovakia     5.2     3790   5.5      10.0 
 
Slovenia     2.0    10800   5.0 (1991)   n/a 
 Bulgaria     9.0     4980  10.5      18.5 
 
Romania   23.0      6900  22.5    33.0 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
EU average    -    16800   2.6       6.2 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sources: R. E. Baldwin Towards an Integrated Europe (London: CEPR, 1994) Tables 7.3 and 7.4, pp. 
166-7 and the Economist 20 August 1994, p. 32. 
 
 
  The second problem concerns the cost of admitting new member states from central and eastern 
Europe. This is a difficult and inevitably contentious calculation and a variety of figures have been 
calculated. The projected estimated increase increases in the EU's budget range from ECU 58.1b.10 for 
just the Visegrad Four in the year 2000 down to ECU 12.9b.11 (1989 levels) for the Visegrad Four 
plus Bulgaria and Romania; another estimate falls between the two at ECU 23.9b.12 (1991 levels) for 
the latter grouping, rising to ECU 26.7b.13 if Slovenia and the three Baltics are added. Whichever 
figure is chosen it is a very substantial addition to the EU budget. In the light of the scale of the 
difficulties faced by the former Soviet satellites, this is perhaps not excessive. However, at a time of 
budgetary restraint when even small increases in the EU budget provoke a major outcry and the future 
willingness of Germany to play the role of the EU's main paymaster is in doubt, an increase of this 
order would seem to be out of the question. Again the possibility of less than full participation in the 
European Union would appear to be the only practical way around this problem. 
  Questions are increasingly being asked about how long these countries are prepared to wait. Is the 
apparent implicit assumption - that seems to have underpinned the EU's footdragging - that they have 
nowhere to go except the EU correct? Or do the 1990s represent a unique window of opportunity for 
eastern and western Europe to come together which, without much more generosity on the part of the 
EU, will disappear as the disappointed and disillusioned countries of the east drift back to some kind of 
renewed version of communism and closer economic ties with Russia and each other? Even if the latter 
is true there must be some doubt as to whether the many EU member states have the wit, wisdom and 
imagination to rise above their usual pursuit of narrow national interest. However, if the time frame for 
action is limited then some (or partial) membership may be better than none at all. 
 
 
(IV) Conclusions: Some Key Issues 
 
 
Must the EU enlarge further, and will it? There is no doubt that the existing EU membership 
approaches these questions with reticence, not to say downright reluctance. Certainly, the EU did its 
best to stem the current tide of enlargement: first the single market had to be completed, then the 
Delors II budget package had to be agreed, and then the (Maastricht) Treaty of European Union. In 
addition to this general unwillingness, there is much ambivalence about certain cases, especially 
Turkey and Cyprus. The EU was also very particular about which applicants in the present phase it 
admitted first and paid scant attention to national sensitivities. After all Turkey's application (1987) 
predates any from EFTA and only Austria (1989) amongst the 1995 intake applied before Cyprus and 
Malta (1990). However, the enlargement process has now begun and the EU clearly has a strong self 
interest in pursuing it further, certainly with regard to central and eastern Europe, perhaps less 
obviously with regard to the Mediterranean applicants. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the EU can 
hold back the tide anyway. Nevertheless, the timing and precise form of the next `enlargement' is 
something that the present EU membership can and will determine. 
  One of the reasons why the EU sought to delay enlargement was because it wished to agree certain 
vital elements of future EU policy so that these would become part of the acquis communautaire that 
new members would have to be accept. Of course, the underlying issue here concerns the possibly of 
widening (enlargement) being incompatible with and holding back deepening (further integration). This is an old debate but a much sharper one in the 1990s because of the scale of the potential coming 
enlargement: the EU is set to double its membership in the 1990s and beyond. It is not just a matter of 
quantity but also of `quality' - the remaining prospective applicants raise much more difficult issues 
than were raised by new members in the past. The fundamental issue is whether enlarging the EU to 
the south and to the east will make the `widening versus deepening' dilemma so acute that it can only 
be resolved by a multi-speed or multi-tier Union. There is also the related issue of whether the present 
Treaty of Rome institutional framework can survive a large increase in membership. The likely answer 
is that it cannot and the maximum amount of flexibility will be required to enable adequate changes to 
be agreed. 
  Ultimately, the issue comes down to the questions of what kind of Europe do the different member 
states want and what kind is practical with a membership of 20-30. There are two aspects of this: the 
organisational structure (multi- or single- tier/speed?) and the organisational nature 
(supranational/federal or intergovernmental?). There are at least three views within the present EU 
membership: 
 
*  Those who favour a single tier/speed supranational and/or federal EU; this is traditionally the view 
favoured by some of the smaller members. 
*  Those who would prefer a much looser intergovernmental EU, notably the British. 
*  Those who propose some sort of multi-tier/speed arrangement, quite possibly by dint of 
circumstance rather than preference. 
 
The latter seems to be the emerging German position. A recent CDU/CSU paper14 proposed a hard 
core of five countries (the original six minus Italy) which must `participate as a matter of course in all 
policy fields', give `the Union a strong centre to counteract the centrifugal forces generated by constant 
enlargement', and `must be open to every member state willing and able to meet its requirements'.15 
This is a clear proposal for a multi-speed Europe. 
  It is important to be precise because the concept of `variable geometry' has three different 
manifestations which have different implications: 
 
(1)  A multi-speed EU is where every member is included in every policy in principal but, in practice, 
each member is moving at a different speed. Consequently, at any moment in time, there will be a 
`hard core' of countries participating in every policy but a number of `slower' countries will only be 
involved at some. However, there is a unity of purpose in the shape of a common end objective and the 
multi-speed track is primarily a device for allowing those who can and wish to go further to do so. 
(2)  A multi-tier EU is where there is no common end goal. It is not a question of different speeds but 
different destinations. The EU is comprised of an inner tier implementing all policies, a second tier 
consisting of a group of countries which have opted out of the same EU policies, a third similar tier but 
with an opt out from more policies, and so on. 
(3)  A Europe à la carte is where there is presumably a hard core of central policies but then a `menu' 
of additional policies which members choose to opt into or out of; it lacks the order of a multi-tier 
arrangement. 
 
Only the first of this implies a unified EU although if the time allowed for laggards to catch up is very 
long then it may effectively amount to (2) or (3). Another critical difference is that although it is likely 
that (1) would probably imply full participation in decision making by all members, this is unlikely for 
(2) and (3); indeed, decision making is likely to become rather complex. In fact, a multi-speed EU is 
actually already here: the European Monetary System was always multi-speed and the provisions for 
economic and monetary union in the Treaty of European Union continue this; moreover, neither the 
Schengen Agreement nor the membership of the Western European Union (WEU) includes all EU 
members. 
  The debate so far has largely been carried on in terms of opinion in existing EU members. But, of 
course, a critical unknown factor concerns the attitudes of aspiring members once they have become 
full EU members. Some of these will be revealed by the actions of Austria, Sweden and Finland at the 
1996 intergovernmental conference. As for those to come, one thing is clear: starry eyed European 
federalists are very thin on the ground beyond the EU's southern and eastern borders. Applicants from 
these regions are seeking EU membership largely for the negative reasons already described. If these countries do lack the political commitment to the model of European integration espoused by the 
original six members then they may to try to divert the EU into the slow lane; indeed, their economic 
weakness may compel them to follow that course. 
  In the face of the scenario the members of the Germans' `hard core' have three options: they can 
accept slower (and probably less) integration, they can move to a multi-speed EU or they can push for 
a multi-tier EU. The first of these is unacceptable and the second would be a pretence because some of 
the countries likely to join the EU would never be able or never want to catch up to the `hard core'. 
This leaves the third. A multi-tier EU has several advantages: 
 
*  It allows weaker or less enthusiastic members to opt out or be excluded from some EU policies. 
*  It does not slow down the fastest ships in the convoy (the `hard core'). 
*  It is a more practical alternative to the rather messy à la carte approach and to the multi-speed in 
theory but à la carte in practice EU. 
*  A coherent decision making framework would emerge whereby members are only directly 
involved in decisions about policies relating to the tier of which they are a member. 
*  It would alow some flexibility in the nature of European cooperation in that supranationality could 
perhaps dominate the `hard core' but the outer tiers might adopt a much looser, intergovernmental 
framework. 
*  It would allow the central and eastern Europeans to become members sooner rather than later, 
possibly joining an outer tier initially, involving political but limited economic cooperation. 
*  Provided there was free movement between tiers, subject to prospective members being willing 
and able to fulfil the requirements of the tier they wished to join, then there is maximum flexibility and 
maximum European integration since EU members will naturally gravitate towards the highest tier 
where they are comfortable. The demonstration effect of a small but highly integrated `inner core' will 
also encourage more rapid integration. 
 
Clearly there are many details which would require attention but a multi-tier EU would be much more 
workable than the current allegedly single tier, single speed EU with national opt outs and a multi-
speed framework for economic and monetary union. Moreover, the inevitable enlargement to the south 
and east can only be made compatible with the continuation of a fully inclusive EU in a multi-tier 
framework. 
 